


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
USSR-JAPAN: Soviets again indicate interest in compromise on Northern Territories issue. (Page 1)

GREECE: Papadopoulos has come under sharp attack and the outlook is for more political uncertainty and popular dissatisfaction. (Page 3)

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USSR-JAPAN: The Soviets are again making discreet attempts to get Japan to think seriously about compromising on the Northern Territories problem. Unofficial statements have been made to Japanese diplomats on at least two occasions recently that Moscow is willing to return two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) claimed by Japan when a peace treaty is signed and that there be "joint use" of the other two major islands.

The USSR has taken informal soundings of this kind before. Early last year there were numerous indications that Moscow was weighing various compromise proposals and soliciting Japanese reaction. By summer, however, the Soviets concluded that Tokyo was trying to capitalize on its improved relations with Peking in order to force Moscow to cave in and return all the islands immediately. To discourage this tactic, the Soviets gave Tokyo's territorial demands short shrift.

Moscow maintained this tougher stand until early March, when an exchange of letters between Tanaka and Brezhnev brought some improvement in the atmosphere. Tanaka helped break the ice by promising that Japan would back the \$1-billion Tyumen oil project, provided agreement could be reached on issues such as price and quality of oil. His move capped earlier indications from Tokyo that Japan would not officially link its participation in joint economic ventures in Siberia with more intractable political problems.

Tokyo's changing attitude showed that it wants better balance in its relations with China and the USSR, and Moscow responded enthusiastically. After the Tanaka-Brezhnev exchange, Soviet media abruptly stopped mentioning the Northern Territories issue--the major stumbling block to significant improvement in Soviet-Japanese political ties. The Soviets have focused instead on prospects for economic cooperation, and have made no secret of their hope that a common interest in better relations across the board will help settle the territorial issue.

(continued)

The Soviets apparently hope to engender some flexibility in the Japanese position by hinting at some give in their own. In floating possible compromise solutions, they have their eye on Tanaka's visit to the USSR late this summer when the Northern Territories question is certain to arise. There will be plenty of time and opportunity for further attempts to probe Tokyo's attitude. Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Osipov, for example, is due in Tokyo later this month,

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GREECE: The government of Prime Minister Papadopoulos has recently been sharply attacked by former prime minister Karamanlis, and a number of the old guard politicians have stood up, apparently anxious to be counted with him. The attack in itself is not a serious blow to the regime; that it could take place at all is a measure of the weakness of the government.

The ruling military junta has never lived up to the promises of its "revolution" six years ago. It has failed in its efforts to:

--make the government efficient and responsive,

--work out a political system that would permit popular participation in government, and

--formally resolve the status of the monarchy and institute a new system of government.

As a result, politically conscious Greeks sense that Papadopoulos' administration is losing steam and, as it enters its seventh year, symptoms of malaise are plentiful:

--Disobedient students continue their opposition to the government even after their revolt was suppressed and civil libertarians who defended them were jailed.

--Troubles on Cyprus between General Grivas and President Makarios threaten to get out of hand while stability on Cyprus and a peaceful relationship with Turkey remain a top priority to Athens. The Turks are now worried that Grivas' violence may engulf the Turkish minority. They have asked Athens to curb the General. But the Papadopoulos government cannot control him.

--A variety of ambitious military officers from all levels are disgusted with the ineffectiveness of the government and have been

plotting against Papadopoulos for years. Their planning has seemed more serious in the past 12 months. Their lack of unanimity and Papadopoulos' vigilance has kept a military coup from succeeding.

Papadopoulos is aware of the symptoms, but he does not appear to have workable ideas about how to tackle the basic issues.

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Papadopoulos is vulnerable, but at present is not weak enough to be thrown out of office by anyone but a concerted group of military officers. The outlook for Greece is for more of the same political uncertainty and popular dissatisfaction.

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Canada-Vietnam: Canadian frustration over the functioning of the ICCS is likely to increase following an incident yesterday in which two Commission helicopters were fired on. An angry Canadian official said that this latest incident, along with Polish-Hungarian obstructionism, would come close to "finishing" the Commission.

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Czechoslovakia-USSR-FRG: Czech Foreign Minister Chnoupek arrived in Moscow yesterday for three days of talks with Soviet officials, probably about Bonn-Prague treaty negotiations that begin next Monday.

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**These items are prepared overnight by CIA without coordination.*

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
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